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AIIB  Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank  
BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
ICT  information and communications technology  
IMF  International Monetary Fund  
NDB  New Development Bank 
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OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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UN  United Nations 
US  United States 
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Summary 
 
This Evidence Report provides a summary account of the role of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) in shaping the current global development landscape. It first 
looks at the origin of the BRICS as a political association, then considers their economic 
trajectories in the first decade and a half of the new century, followed by an investigation of 
the political and global governance implications of the involvement of the BRICS in the new 
economic and political geographies unfolding in the multipolar world of today. Finally, the 
report considers the BRICS as a vector in the evolving development cooperation scene. 
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1  In the beginning: what’s in an acronym? 
 
It is commonly understood that the political association now functioning under the acronym 
BRICS was inspired by the acronym BRIC, created in a paper written in 2001 by Jim O’Neill 
(now Lord O’Neill), then Chief Economist of Goldman Sachs. The Goldman Sachs article 
proposed that on the basis of their dynamic economic performance in the 1990s, Brazil, 
Russia, India and China would be the drivers of world economic growth in the foreseeable 
future and should all be invited to join the G8 (Russia had been part of the G7/8 since 1997) 
(O’Neill 2001). The first decade of the new millennium validated this economic prognosis. 
And in 2008, in the midst of severe financial crisis, all of the BRICs were included along with 
other major players in the global economy in the G20 Heads of State Summit, a historic 
global governance innovation created overnight by building on the established G20 Finance 
Ministers process that included South Africa as well. 
  
Yet the etymology of the BRICS can be derived another way, more closely entwined with the 
ongoing political association that held its first Heads of State Summit Meeting in 
Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009.1 Here, the history begins with the RIC club – Russia, India 
and China – meeting informally in New York in the margins of United Nations (UN) General 
Assemblies from 2003, and annually on a formal basis at the level of foreign ministers since 
2005. The idea of establishing a BRICs grouping came as a carefully thought-through 
Russian initiative worked out by Foreign Minister Lavrov and President Putin. In 2006, 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov invited Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim 
(building on a long-established personal friendship) to an informal lunch of RIC foreign 
ministers in New York. Following from that first contact and on the initiative of President 
Putin, a BRIC foreign ministers meeting was convened in September 2006 in New York, and 
again in 2007, on the fringes of the UN General Assembly. The first stand-alone BRICs 
Heads of State meeting was convened by President Medvedev in Yekaterinburg in July 
2009. After the second BRICs Summit meeting in 2010 in Brasília, an invitation to South 
Africa to attend the 2011 Summit meeting in Sanya (Hainan, China) as a new member, 
generated the acronym BRICS (Shubin 2013). Alphabetical serendipity thus complemented 
the economic and political logic, while serving to reinforce the existential ambiguity of the 
BRICS acronym with its dual etymology. 
 
                                               
1 A history of the origins of the BRICS as a political association can be found in Kornegay and Bohler-Muller (2013), which 
assembles a comprehensive set of perspectives by authors from each of the BRICS. 
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2  The BRICS as an economic vector 
 
As a symbol of the broader emerging markets phenomenon, the BRICS acronym, applied in 
its broader common usage (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), captured a 
remarkable transition in the global economy. According to the Chief Economist of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), in the 1980s, emerging and developing countries 
accounted for 36 per cent of world output in purchasing power parity terms, and 43 per cent 
of world growth in that decade. In 2010–15 those numbers leapt to 56 per cent of world 
output and 79 per cent of world growth. The conclusion to be drawn is that a predominantly 
advanced developed country lens is an ever more outmoded approach to viewing the world 
economy (Obstfeld 2016). 
 
The emerging markets story, including the BRICS and beyond, has thus been a powerful 
catalyst for trade and investment and poverty reduction globally over this period, notably 
helping to boost growth in the Asian, Latin American and African regions. This ‘shifting 
wealth’ phenomenon has underpinned the basic agenda of the BRICS as a political 
association working to shift global governance norms and arrangements established under a 
United States (US)-led post-Second World War, to reflect the present and future 
configuration of world economic and political power.  
 
At the same time, the extraordinary role of China in generating the emerging markets 
phenomenon in general and the economic trajectories of the BRICS as a particular group is 
essential to this story. As it integrated into the global trade regime and opened up to foreign 
investment, China’s growth surged, generating a super-cycle in commodities that lifted 
growth rates in commodity-exporting countries around the world, in rich and poor regions 
alike. China’s own investments in creating commodity supply chains further pushed this 
process, along with the ‘going out’ policy to encourage direct investment by Chinese 
companies, notably in the construction and information and communications technology 
(ICT) industries. When China countered the global recession of 2009 with a major investment 
package for provinces and local governments in China, the macroeconomic impact via 
commodity markets was global, helping commodity exporters to survive the financial crisis 
generated in the financial markets of the US and Europe. Among the major beneficiaries 
were fellow members of the BRICS – Brazil, Russia and South Africa.  
 
From 2014, the BRICS economic vector changed. China’s move to a lower ‘new normal’ 
growth path based on domestic consumption and decarbonisation of the economy rather 
than investment and exports has pushed the commodity cycle into reverse, exposing the 
weaknesses in the economic structures and testing the political systems of the commodity-
exporting BRICS. Brazil, Russia and South Africa each have particular structural and political 
challenges of a medium-term nature and are unlikely to be in the ranks of emerging country 
growth stories again until they find a new way forward. Meanwhile it is India that is moving 
forward at a fast pace (albeit with major social and structural challenges), spurred by 
economic reforms that favour private sector development and mass consumption, with ICTs 
helping to rationalise and improve poverty reduction programmes.2  
 
Assuming that China will be able to manage its ambitious and comprehensive reform agenda 
in a way that maintains the ‘new normal’ growth rate of 6.5 per cent, there is hence the 
                                               
2 A key point to note, however, is that poverty reduction in India (which still has far to go) has occurred not only because of 
economic growth but also because of legislation such as the Right to Food and associated policies such as the Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) as well as empowerment of the local government system 
(Panchayats) linked with reservations for women and other historically marginalised groups, and other social sector schemes. 
This is a pattern that also applies to other BRICS countries, notably Brazil, which alone among the BRICS has substantially 
reduced income inequality over the last decade. 
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medium-term prospect that together China and India, with a combined population 
approaching some three billion people, will be major drivers of global growth into the 
medium- and long-term future. This prospect is important for the other BRICS, but also for 
the global economy and development prospects at large, underlining the global significance 
of the issues raised by the financial volatility in China that has emerged in 2015 and early 
2016.3  
 
The cogency of the BRICS as an investment category has thus changed radically. For the 
ten years through 2010, the MSCI BRIC Index had returned 308 per cent compared with a  
15 per cent return on the Standard and Poors Index in that period. But with other fast-
growing developing countries emerging onto the scene, a new larger category of emerging 
markets has become a more compelling investment story (O’Neill, Stupnytska and Wrisdale 
2011). With this ongoing change, Goldman Sachs’s emblematic BRIC Fund declined by      
21 per cent over five years and in 2015 was folded into a wider Goldman Sachs’s Emerging 
Markets Equity Fund. The original BRIC investment story was over. But the story of China 
and India as major global growth engines now forecast at between 6 and 8 per cent growth 
per annum for the next two years and with the possibility of maintaining such growth through 
to the middle of the century, would indeed change the shape of the global economy and 
hence the shape of global governance and development patterns.  
 
                                               
3 The ratings agency Fitch, in a study framed by the Oxford Economics Global Economic Model, tests a scenario in which 
China’s growth rate falls to 2.3 per cent (a scenario Fitch judges as unlikely). In these circumstances the model suggests that 
global growth would fall from a base case of 3.1 per cent to 1.8 per cent in 2017 with the persistence of a world of low interest 
rates, low growth and low prices for oil and other commodities. Report available at www.fitch.com. The World Bank’s 2016 
Global Economic Prospects report suggests that a 1 per cent decline in the growth of the five BRICS generates a 0.8 per cent 
decline in the growth of other emerging and developing countries and a 0.4 per cent decline in global growth (World Bank 2016).  
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3  The BRICS as a political vector 
 
What could be the cogency of the BRICS as a political vector in a scenario, where by mid-
century, India’s economy would be as large as the US economy and China would be           
50 per cent larger than the US and India combined (Merchant 2013)? The three other 
BRICS, with their complementarities as resource suppliers, would be pulled along by such a 
China and India growth vector, as would many other developing and developed countries, 
albeit in a world of declining resource intensity as green growth and broader technological 
advances change the nature of demand for goods and services and for labour and human 
capital. 
 
The BRICS as a political vector originated as a Russian initiative, with a logic first articulated 
in Russian concept notes on foreign policy and on the BRICS and then reflected in the 
declarations of successive BRICS summit meetings, most recently in the declarations 
emerging from the Ufa BRICS Summit of July 2015.4 The fundamental logic is that the 
international system is in a process of transformation towards multipolarity – and in that 
future world, US prominence in the world order would give way to a sharing of voice, initiative 
and responsibility (Acharya 2014). The vision that continues to permeate the BRICS leaders 
statements is of a world which is more just and fair, under the rule of international law and 
the UN, where regime change is not part of the agenda of the most powerful states, and 
where voting structures in the Bretton Woods institutions are reformed to reflect the new 
economic balance in the world. It is this central logic that made the proposal to constitute the 
BRICS from Russia, a country looking to exercise a major role in this global transformation, 
attractive to the other initial members, all three considering themselves as rising powers, and 
to South Africa with its aspirations to be the leading voice of a rising Africa.  
 
The Russian initiative came at a time when a US-led coalition had overthrown the regime in 
Iraq. And at around the same time an acute financial crisis generated significant reputational 
damage to the countries and institutions at the heart of global economic management. Hence 
the concept of a group of major countries from outside this circle taking a collective 
perspective on the shape of the international system of the future did have a logic and an 
appeal, even if the BRICS geopolitical interests may not always be convergent.  
 
With history as the mother of invention, the G20 was invented on the spot in 2008 to avert 
major global financial and economic catastrophe. The BRICS fully shared in the G20’s self-
nomination in 2009 as the world’s premier economic forum. Indeed, this is a formula that has 
been repeated in BRICS statements ever since. For the BRICS, the advent of the G20 has 
been a validation of the position that global governance systems would need to become 
multipolar. It was at a G20 meeting in 2010 that the deal was reached to reform the voting 
structures of the IMF (and hence the voting structures of the World Bank as an automatic 
follow-on). Opposition in the US Congress to such an overt shift in relative economic power 
delayed implementation of this change for over five years, widely seen as damaging US 
longer-term interests in maintaining the legitimacy of the Bretton Woods institutions. Thus it 
was with evident relief that the US Treasury Secretary, in his press release welcoming the 
inclusion of the IMF reforms in an Omnibus Spending Bill passed by the Congress in mid-
December 2015, stated that they ‘reinforce the central leadership role of the US in the global 
economic system and demonstrate the US commitment to maintaining that position’ (US 
Department of the Treasury 2015). In her announcement on this occasion, the Managing 
Director of the IMF noted, in counterpoint, that the reforms ‘improve the IMF’s governance, 
better reflecting the role of the dynamic emerging and developing countries in the global 
                                               
4 For BRICS documents see BRICS Information Centre: www.bricsutoronto.ca. 
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economy’ bringing four emerging market economies (Brazil, China, India and Russia) among 
the ten largest members of the IMF while also increasing the voice of African countries (IMF 
2015). Hence one of the talismanic concerns of the global South was advanced by the 
BRICS working inside and outside the G20. 
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4  Global governance in a world of new 
political and economic geographies 
 
The dynamic at work as the BRICS seek to shape the global governance system of the 
future is a process of challenge and convergence (Li and Carey 2014), with the international 
development system as a key arena. As an example of such a challenge and convergence 
process in action, the interregnum associated with the stalled Congressional assent to the 
IMF reform saw the creation by the BRICS of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the 
Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). In addition, having initiated the idea of the New 
Development Bank (on a proposal from Chen Yuan, then President of the China 
Development Bank), China also launched the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). Much to the consternation of US officials, the United Kingdom (UK) 
decided to join the AIIB in early 2015, triggering applications from a significant number of 
other developed countries.  
 
At the Washington summit meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Obama in 
September 2015, the official Chinese record indicates that an agreement had been reached 
on the concept of a ‘new model major country relationship’, acknowledging China’s status as 
a major power while working to ensure that the rising power process would be a peaceful 
one. As part of this agreement, the US would push forward with the 2010 IMF reform 
package, while the Chinese side would ensure that the new multilateral institutions it was 
supporting, and any further such institutions in the future, would be professionally managed 
and adhere to accepted standards and practices of existing multilaterals. Further, China 
would participate meaningfully in replenishment rounds of the existing multilateral 
development finance institutions (People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2015). 
 
Though not disclosed by the US side at the time of the Xi–Obama summit in September, this 
agreement as elaborated in the Chinese record, represented the challenge–convergence 
dynamic underlying the inclusion of the IMF reform in the December 2015 Omnibus 
Spending Bill as passed by the US Congress. And according to the US Chief Climate 
negotiator the ‘new model major country relationship’, first advanced by the Chinese in 2013, 
also underlay the China–US diplomacy that led to the joint Xi–Obama statement on climate 
change policy objectives that contributed decisively to the successful outcome of the Paris 
Climate Change conference (Brookings Institution 2015). This rare explicit reference to the 
Chinese concept by a US official provides testimony to the emergence of a multipolar world 
order, however politically sensitive that remains. In this same time period, the summit 
meeting between President Xi and the British prime minister David Cameron in the UK 
produced a number of major financial agreements, including for the co-ownership and 
construction of nuclear power plants and other major long-term infrastructure investments, 
and for RMB financial market development in London. The UK also gave its support to the 
Chinese One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Silk Roads initiative. US officials are reported to have 
expressed their view that in engaging in such initiatives the UK has been leaping into the 
unknown, without due caution regarding the future of China and its role in a changing world 
order and the possible damage to longstanding Western alliances.  
 
The comprehensive and elaborate declarations that have emerged from each of the BRICS 
Summit meetings carefully track and treat the complex and evolving areas of tension and 
cooperation in the international political and economic arena. It is evident in these statements 
that there is no monolithic BRICS position on the major faultlines such as the Ukrainian crisis 
or the tensions in the South China Sea or the Middle East. Nor is there any ideological or 
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ideational content in the treatment of economic issues. This reflects the basic position that 
the BRICS group is not a forum for confrontation with the ‘West’ or for confrontation among 
BRICS countries themselves. Any such confrontations take place in other settings. The 
BRICS process is careful to stay nested within the G20 and to avoid revisiting positions that 
members have taken in the UN; indeed the BRICS process aims to ‘strengthen’ an 
international system through which they look to generate and maintain world order even as 
they assume a growing role in that world order.  
 
The reluctance at this point to expand beyond the existing membership is an indication of a 
calculation that the current mode of the BRICS represents an equilibrium that is providing 
enough of a challenge function in the evolving world order. To expand further would be more 
complicated than warranted. Rather, the direction is to expand the intra-BRICS programme 
of knowledge exchange across the wide range of policy areas in which ministerial and 
expert-level work is conducted, ‘slowly laying the foundations for a multipolar order that will 
allow them to shape global order according to their interests’ (Stuenkel 2015). The current 
horizon, set out in the most recent Action Plan emerging from the Ufa Summit in 2015, 
includes establishing a virtual secretariat in the form of a permanent open website that would 
be a repository for all BRICS documents and work programmes (BRICS 2015a). Such a 
virtual secretariat would leapfrog the G20, which is still discussing how to move beyond the 
establishment of a new website under every new G20 presidency. The issues here are not 
insignificant in political management terms and the dynamics of the rotating presidency. But 
the impact in terms of efficiency, engagement and profile could also be significant. In 
pursuing the virtual secretariat concept, the BRICS objective is perhaps best understood as 
becoming and being recognised as a source of initiative and knowledge in a multipolar world, 
in a system of polycentric multilateralism or ‘minilateralism’ that is forming to an important 
degree outside formal institutional structures (Patrick 2016).5 
  
Indeed, looking ahead, it is difficult to imagine that the economic dynamics at play in a global 
economy with China and India with a combined three billion people and an Africa 
approaching two billion people will not engender profound changes in global governance 
systems, with the G20 in particular, but also the BRICS, as forums acting as moderators of 
such changes with their flexible agendas and Heads of State convening powers. 
 
At the same time, there are different views as to whether and how soon there might be a 
decisive ‘global transformation’ in which the BRICS become clearly the leading players 
assuming concomitant roles and responsibilities. One view is that the US is far from being in 
decline, with its global impact via its policies, corporations, technologies and military 
capacities even increasing. In the case of Europe, on the other hand, relative decline and 
political coherence may well be the outcome of adverse demographic dynamics, 
compounded by the impact of refugee flows from a destabilised Middle East and North 
Africa, partly a ‘blowback’ from the 2003 invasion of Iraq and 2011 intervention in Libya. In 
this reading, the main challenges to world order are likely to be increasing inequality within 
countries throughout the developed and emerging worlds, linked inter alia to the work-
replacing bias of contemporary technological change, which could provoke severe social and 
political disruption. Climate change impacts, including disruptive weather events, would be 
another of these global problems transcending any global governance transformation. At risk 
from the economics and politics of rising inequality would be the progress made on reducing 
poverty, including the encroachment of fiscal pressures and re-emerging debt problems on 
                                               
5 A significant development in this context is the expanding membership and networks of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) with its largely soft law and peer review/learning processes. It now embraces 34 members, 
many more ad hoc participating countries, operates a dozen ‘Global Forums’ and has four of the BRICS as ‘Key Partners’ of the 
OECD (Brazil, China, India and South Africa, which are each also full members of the OECD Development Centre). Russia was 
on the verge of OECD membership until the annexation of the Crimea brought a halt to the accession process. All of the BRICS 
except for Russia have also become Associate Members of the International Energy Agency. 
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the fiscal space available for conditional cash transfers that have proved an effective means 
of tackling extreme poverty. ‘The rise of the South, the “decline” of the US, and the 
“transformation” of the international order should be put into this wider context’ (Kiely 2015). 
The theme announced for the 8th BRICS Summit to be held in Panaji, Goa, in October 2016, 
‘Building Responsive, Inclusive and Collective Solutions’ might be seen as reflecting such a 
reading of the global problematiques driving agenda-setting for the G20 and BRICS.  
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5  The BRICS as a development cooperation 
vector 
 
With the BRICS as an economic vector providing some 80 per cent of global economic 
growth in 2010–15 (Obstfeld 2016) the impact of the BRICS on development progress and 
prospects at a macroeconomic level has been critical. It will remain critically important 
through the complex cyclical and structural transitions now facing the BRICS countries, with 
China’s transition of particular significance. And as the discussion above on the international 
political impact of the BRICS indicates, the forum has provided a challenge function in the 
international system, while at the same time its members support and participate in the G20 
system. And the BRICS have all supported individually the trio of 2015 UN Agreements on 
universal sustainable development goals, on development financing beyond official 
development assistance, and on climate change – three agreements that already introduce 
significant evolutions in global governance systems (UN 2015a, 2015b; UNFCCC 2015). 
 
In terms of the impact of the BRICS on development cooperation, traditionally divided 
between North–South and South–South cooperation, the story is mixed. All of the BRICS 
have agendas for making their development cooperation more effective, but so far there has 
been no real attempt to pull together a BRICS development cooperation strategy. Indeed, it 
has been argued that the search for a narrative for Southern providers of development 
cooperation (i.e. emerging powers) is still a work in progress, ‘with few positive results and 
some worrying side effects’ (Bracho 2015). This situation follows from the successive High 
Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness in Accra (in 2008) and Busan (in 2011), where the special 
identity and relevance of South-South Cooperation were embedded in the outcome texts, but 
issues of buy-in and participation to follow-up processes, particularly the Global Partnership 
for Effective Development Cooperation, remain unresolved to date.  
 
The BRICS as a political association has not attempted to step into this arena or even to 
assess its opportunities. Indeed, the first meeting of BRICS senior officials responsible for 
international development cooperation took place only in December 2015, seemingly, 
however, without the engagement of key officials (BRICS 2015b). This senior officials 
meeting followed a mandate in the BRICS Ufa Declaration, where the BRICS leaders 
committed ‘to strengthen partnerships for advancing international development cooperation 
and to begin interaction through dialogue, cooperation and exchange of experience in 
advancing international development cooperation’ (BRICS 2015a). How this promising 
undertaking might be developed will probably become clearer under the Indian Presidency of 
the BRICS in 2016, given the active role of India in efforts to generate dialogue and 
cooperation among South–South actors, and then under the presidency of China in 2017.  
 
Both China and India were present at the Bandung meeting of 1955, where the objectives 
and principles of South-South Cooperation were first laid out. In the case of China, aid 
principles were codified in a speech by Zhou Enlai in Accra in 1964, which remain a basic 
reference today, even if Chinese development finance has evolved massively beyond the 
realm of concessional aid (Xu and Carey 2015b). Mutual benefit, knowledge-sharing and 
non-interference remain the framework of South-South Cooperation. Yet it is now much 
harder to identify the domain of development cooperation as distinct from global business as 
the multinationals of the BRICS countries engage and compete in the developing countries of 
the South and as new fields and modes of public/private development cooperation are 
codified by the OECD countries (OECD 2016). In addition, the non-interference principle 
becomes less sustainable when BRICS countries have large-scale commercial activities at 
risk around the world and agendas for building effective states and regional security replace 
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relationships based on liberation efforts and philosophies (Li and Carey 2014). China is 
boosting its capacity to engage in peacekeeping efforts. 
 
Meanwhile, the most famous BRICS initiative so far has been to establish a New 
Development Bank (NDB). Located in Shanghai under an Indian president and now on the 
threshold of its first operations, the policies and programmes of the NDB will be watched with 
great interest for signs of new approaches and the manner in which safeguards in the areas 
of environment and resettlement are handled. Preliminary conversations on policy and 
positioning have taken place in various international financial centres. Issues include how the 
NDB may push the envelope on development finance and the international financial 
architecture in a world where risk capital is at a premium while capital adequacy rules are 
being tightened and where green finance is a major international agenda. Reputational 
stakes associated with the functioning of the NDB are high for the BRICS as a political 
association. Operations are to encompass BRICS countries and sub-Saharan Africa, with an 
African Regional Centre already established in Johannesburg. 
 
At the same time, Chinese initiatives have created not only the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, but also a Silk Roads Fund, and a decision has been taken to establish a 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Bank, with India and Pakistan as new members 
of the SCO. The Ufa SCO meeting held alongside the BRICS Summit agreed to promote 
synergies between the SCO Development Bank, the OBOR Silk Roads initiative and the 
Eurasian Economic Union. Hence the RIC association, where the BRICS association was 
conceived, is now giving birth to a strategic Eurasian economic cooperation system based 
around connectivity and energy investments and political stability objectives. China has also 
developed ambitious strategic frameworks and financing facilities for industrialisation and 
development in the African continent via the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, as 
elaborated in the Johannesburg Declaration of December 2015 (Forum on China–Africa 
Cooperation 2015a, 2015b; Carey and Li 2016). And in Latin America, China has launched a 
partnership with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States with triennial 
meetings and plans for continental connectivity investments. At the level of intellectual and 
political impetus, China is establishing a new centre for international knowledge on 
development, a Silk Road Think Tank and a heads of state-level forum for the Silk Road 
initiative. And in the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, President Xi 
announced a US$2bn South–South Fund for SDG implementation and a US$3.1bn South–
South Fund for climate change financing. An institute for the study of South–South 
Cooperation is being established alongside a Centre for New Structural Economics at Peking 
University concerned with economic transformation, notably in African countries as Chinese 
wage rates increase and manufacturing jobs migrate out of China.  
 
Systemically, all these Chinese initiatives and the BRICS New Development Bank imply a 
new economic and political geography of international development cooperation, with BRICS 
leadership and engagement (Xu and Carey 2015a). They also help to breathe new life into 
multilateral development finance. Old and new institutions must now compete and cooperate. 
Prospectively, this should generate a major increase in the demand and supply of 
development finance at interest rates reflecting sovereign guaranteed funding costs, thus 
promoting one of the main policy recommendations emerging from the Financing for 
Development conference in Addis Ababa in July 2015 (Spratt and Barone 2015; UN 2015a).  
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6  Conclusion 
 
The flowering of the BRICS collectively as an emerging economy category can now be seen 
in retrospect as a 20-year phenomenon, beginning in the mid-1990s and running to the end 
of the commodity super-cycle associated largely with China’s transition to a ‘new normal’ 
growth policy under the administration of President Xi Jinping in 2013. (The BRICS category 
remains in use in the World Bank’s most recent growth projections, but it was never 
incorporated into the IMF’s analytical categories.) Today, three of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia 
and South Africa) have been severely impacted by the fall in commodity prices from their 
previous peaks and are confronting the need to adjust current finances and map out new 
strategies for achieving faster growth and sustainable development progress. At the same 
time India and China continue to grow at moderately fast rates that, although involving major 
domestic policy challenges, given the size of their populations and the weight of their 
economies, especially that of China, means that in three decades India’s economy could be 
as large as that of the US and China’s economy could be 50 per cent higher than the US and 
India combined (Merchant 2013). This is the prospect that will increasingly bear on 
perspectives for the global economy. The working-age population of sub-Saharan Africa will 
grow rapidly alongside the expansion of India’s working-age population so that China, India 
and sub-Saharan Africa will each have more or less equal pools of working-age people, far 
outstripping those of other continents, albeit at very different wage rates although the 
democratisation of technologies in a zero-marginal-cost world promises large increases in 
living standards everywhere. 
  
On the geopolitical front, the BRICS are likely to continue to work as an association of states 
positing a multipolar world, but that vision is already a reality as US power is used more 
sparingly. And the development partnerships that they engage in will be many and various, 
extending outside their BRICS identity, as is again already clear. Here, their active 
membership in the G20 is the most important vector, more important to each of them than 
the BRICS association although they were ready collectively to defend Russian participation 
in the Brisbane G20 Summit of 2014 when that came into question following the Russian 
annexation of the Crimea. Their impact on the international development system has already 
been palpable in terms of creating new institutions outside of the established multilateral 
system (Cooper and Farooq 2015). Now much will depend on how the BRICS New 
Development Bank works out, how China’s multiple initiatives in development finance 
perform and how the BRICS themselves perform over the coming years as 21st-century 
developmental states, providing new avenues for ‘transforming our world’, ‘leaving no one 
behind’ and contributing to the combat against global warming, in line with global agreements 
reached in 2015 in the United Nations. 
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